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Introduction 
 
In September, 2005, then-Senator Barack Obama articulated his views on 
qualities he deemed essential for a Justice serving on the Supreme Court.  While 
acknowledging that “95 percent” of cases that come before most any court would be 
decided similarly by “a Scalia” or “a Ginsburg” based on settled precedent and rules of 
constitutional construction, President Obama asserted that what matters most “is those 5 
percent of cases that are truly difficult.”2  In such cases, he continued, established 
precedent “will only get you through the 25th mile of the marathon…[t]hat last mile can 
only be determined on the basis of one’s deepest values, one’s core concerns, one’s 
broader perspectives on how the world works, and the depth and breadth of one’s 
empathy.”3  The “critical ingredient” in deciding such cases is “supplied by what is in the 
judge’s heart.”4  President Obama refined and reasserted his position in favor of an 
empathetic Justice upon the appointment of Sonia Sotomayor in 2009, saying that he 
would “seek someone who understands that justice isn't about some abstract legal theory 
or footnote in a casebook"5 and that he views empathy as “an essential ingredient for 
arriving at just decisions and outcomes.”6 
Perhaps unsurprisingly the idea that “empathy” should be either a characteristic of 
nominees to the Court or a tool used by members of the Court has sparked its fair share of 
                                                 
2
  151 Cong. Rec. 21,032 (2005)(floor Statement of Senator Barack Obama on Nomination of John 
Roberts to be Chief Justice)[hereinafter Floor Statement].     
3
  Id. 
4
  Id. 
5
  President Barack Obama, Remarks on the Retirement of Justice David Souter (May 1, 2009), 
available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/DCPD-200900317.pdf cited in Major Garrett, 
Obama Pushes for Empathetic Supreme Court Justices, Fox News, May 1, 2009 available at 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/05/01/obama-pushes-empathetic-supreme-court-justices/.   
6
  Id.   
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controversy from across the political spectrum.7  Although a lynchpin of then-Senator 
Obama’s thinking and rhetoric during the confirmation process of John Roberts and also 
through Obama’s own nomination of Sonia Sotomayor, empathy was scarcely mentioned 
by the President when nominating Elena Kagan.8  During the Sotomayor hearings then-
nominee Sotomayor herself in fact evaded in-depth discussion of the specific subject of 
empathy.9  By the time of Kagan’s nomination to the Court the Obama administration had 
stopped mentioning empathy in public statements regarding nominees altogether.10  But 
why?  Overwhelmingly, the answer has been taken to be a result of the political 
complications around elaborating on the notion of empathy.  Legal philosophical and 
jurisprudential arguments are either too esoteric for meaningful public consumption or 
can easily become political “hot button” issues.  As such, during the confirmation of 
Justice Sotomayor Democratic Senators “charged with shepherding Sotomayor through 
the mountain pass of the Senate confirmation process,”11 were extremely careful of letting 
Sotomayor’s nomination “slip into some philosophical crevasse.”12 
                                                 
7
  See , e.g., id; Erwin Chemerinsky, The Need for Empathy on the Court, National Law Journal, 
Oct. 31, 2011; Editorial,The Supreme Court: Empathy v. Law – Which Sonia Sotomayor is the Senate 
About to Confirm?, The Economist, Jul. 16, 2009, available at http://www.economist.com/node/14031304;  
Jonah Goldberg, Empathy and the Supreme Court, L.A. Times, Apr. 13, 2010, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/13/opinion/la-oe-goldberg13-2010apr13;  John Paul Rollert, Obama’s 
Empathy for the Supreme Court, Mar. 22, 2011, Huffington Post available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-paul-rollert/obamas-empathy-for-the-su_b_838638.html;  Janet Hook 
& Christi Parsons, Obama Calls Empathy Key to Supreme Court Pick, May 2, 2009, L.A. Times available 
at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/may/02/nation/na-court-souter2.  
8
  See John Paul Rollert, Reversed on Appeal: The Uncertain Future of President Obama’s Empathy 
Standard, 120 Yale L.J. 89, 90 (2010).  This article, cited frequently herein, stands out as a leading piece of 
scholarship on President Obama’s empathy standard.   
9
  Id.   
10
  Id.  
11
  Id.   
12
  Id.   
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Interestingly, despite the political sensitivities surrounding the use of the term 
“empathy,” empathy has often been cited as a desirable quality for those serving in other 
public functions.  Perhaps most obvious is the “empathizer-in-chief” title laudably 
bestowed upon Bill Clinton by members of the press.13  Moreover, that empathy is an 
admirable characteristic of members of a democratic society generally is hardly subject to 
dispute.14 Further, the idea that empathy or similar characteristics and traits are desirable 
ones for members of the Supreme Court is not entirely new.  In the empathy “vein” 
Woodrow Wilson famously remarked that only those who understand “that law is 
subservient to life and not life to law”15 are suitable nominees to the Court.  Benjamin 
Cardozo in a series of influential writings on judicial decision-making has been 
understood as articulating that “judges should be true to their sense of justice, shaped as it 
is by their own life experiences”16 when the letter of the law is less than clear in its 
application to the particular facts at hand.  Justice William Rehnquist himself in a rarely 
cited article published early in his legal career inadvertently highlighted the gap to be 
filled by empathy when he wrote: 
It is high time that those critical of the present Court 
recognize … [that] the constitution has been what the 
judges say it is…[i]f greater judicial self-restraint is 
desired, or a different interpretation of the phrases “due 
                                                 
13
  See Howard Fineman, The Next Florida, Newsweek, Oct. 31, 2004, available at 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2004/10/31/the-next-florida.html.   
14
  See John Paul Rollert, supra note 7 at 106 (“…no one can deny that [empathy] is a powerful virtue 
in a large and diverse democracy.”).   
15
  Woodrow Wilson, “An After-Dinner Talk” (Dec. 9, 1916), in 40 The Papers of Woodrow Wilson 
193, 196 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1982) as cited in Catherine Crowe, Videri Quam Esse: The Role of Empathy 
in Judicial Discourse, 34 Law & Psychol. Rev. 121 (2010). 
16
  See Kim McClane Wardlaw, Umpires, Empathy, and Activism: Lessons from Judge Cardozo, 85 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1629, 1633 (2010).   
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process of law” or “equal protection of the laws,” then men 
sympathetic to such desires must sit upon the high court.17 
 
Although not speaking directly to the value of empathy in his article Justice Rehnquist 
appears at least to recognize the place of characteristics such as empathy on the Court.  
Even if Justice Rehnquist is not personally a proponent of empathy as a consideration in 
the nomination and confirmation process his remarks reveal, perhaps more articulately 
and significantly than others, the critical role that empathy could play in the decision-
making process at the Supreme Court level.     
The possibilities for empathy as a judicial tool, as opposed to a personal 
characteristic of nominees to the Court, are likewise not new or novel concepts.  Empathy 
has previously been advanced outside of the context of the Court’s confirmation process 
as an explicit tool for judges looking at cases involving a wide range of legal issues as 
diverse as Section 1983,18 immigration,19 discrimination and Title VII,20 pleading 
standards,21 economic equality and predatory lending,22 and gender issues23 among others.  
The most recent scholarship on empathy as a characteristic of Justices and in the 
confirmation process however has addressed empathy’s historical significance and 
                                                 
17
  William H. Rehnquist, The Making of a Supreme Court Justice, Harv. L. Rec. (Oct. 8, 1959) 10.   
18
  See Sheldon Nahmod, The Restructuring of Narrative and Empathy in 1983 Cases, 72 Chi.-Kent 
L. Rev. 819 (1997).   
19
  See Lauren Gilbert, The 26th Mile: Empathy and the Immigration Decisions of Justice Sotomayor, 
31 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 1 (2010).     
20
  See Michael J. Zimmer, Systemic Empathy, 34 Colum. Human Rights L. Rev. 575 (2003). 
21
  See Darrell A.H. Miller, Iqbal and Empathy, 78 UMKC L. Rev. 999 (2010).   
22
  See Mitchell F. Crusto, Obama’s Moral Capitalism: Resuscitating the American Dream, 63 U. 
Miami L. Rev. 1011 (2009).   
23
  See Hon. Diane S. Sykes, Speech: Gender and Judging, 94 Marq. L. Rev. 1381 (2011).   
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roots,24 the political nature of empathy and theoretical political strategies for overcoming 
weaknesses in the empathy argument,25 and the tenuous political future of empathy as a 
quality overtly sought in nominees to the Court.26  The thrust of this recent scholarship 
focuses on empathy’s benefits.27  The various authors examining empathy as a 
characteristic of Supreme Court nominees include scholars, federal and state judges, and 
practitioners alike with the majority view tending to hold that despite the political 
thorniness of invoking empathy the Obama administration should continue to consider 
the empathetic capabilities of potential nominees in selecting future Justices.   
With these considerations in mind this paper will seek to germinate answers to the 
overarching question: what is the current meaning and purpose of empathy as a quality 
for Supreme Court Justices and how can, and should, this purpose be effectively 
promoted moving forward?  Working within the recent line of scholarship on empathy 
just mentioned this paper supports the position that empathy is both a desirable and 
necessary quality for nominees to the Court but also suggests that it should not be the 
only defining quality considered by the president.  The paper will argue first that the 
Obama administration’s conception of empathy is clear, reasonable, and workable and 
review the political considerations that seem to have stymied overtly embracing empathy 
as a consideration.  Further, this paper will show that the role empathy might play for a 
particular justice once on the Court is uncertain, suggesting that perhaps empathy should 
                                                 
24
  See Wardlaw, supra note 12 (discussing the role of empathy for Judge Cardozo and the way in 
which he discredited the notion that the legal system was a group of “preordained” rules “logically to be 
discovered and mechanically to be applied”).   
25
  See Tobin A. Sparling, Resurrecting the Argument for Judicial Empathy: Can a Dead Duck Be 
Successfully Repackaged for Sale to a Skeptical Public?  20 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 1 (2010) 
26
  See Rollert, supra note 7.  
27
  See supra notes 23-25.   
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not be the leading consideration advanced by the president in choosing a nominee.  This 
paper will reveal the arguments for why empathy is a very meaningful and admirable 
quality and should remain a consideration, however, the paper will also show that for 
policy and practical political reasons empathy should probably not occupy the central 
public role initially suggested by President Obama in the nomination of Sonia 
Sotomayor, or be the only factor considered in choosing future nominees.     
In order to structure the argument this paper culls the confirmation records and 
testimonies of four current Justices purportedly nominated and confirmed to the Court 
because of the unique perspective they would bring as Justices:28  Clarence Thomas, 
appointed by George H. W. Bush; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, appointed by Bill Clinton; and 
Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan, both nominees of Barack Obama and by default 
arguably symbolic of his empathy standard.  By examining the confirmation testimony 
and select subsequent decisions of these Justices the paper will examine the role 
considerations of empathy actually played throughout the nomination and confirmation 
processes, and more critically, the potential for empathy as a characteristic of future 
nominees by briefly discussing some work of these Justices in the remaining pages.29 
Part I will examine what has become the “Obama standard” and the understanding 
of empathy advanced by President Obama arguing that the concept of empathy as a 
consideration is clear and reasonable as well as important and meaningful.  Part II will 
consider the four nominations and confirmations of the previously mentioned Justices 
with a focus on notions of empathy throughout their nomination and confirmation 
                                                 
28
  See infra notes 48-51.   
29
  Due to space constraints neither the historical accounts of the confirmation hearings nor the 
concluding analysis are meant to be completely exhaustive.  Either could be expanded in further work or 
expanded accounts.   
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processes and the political implications of empathy as a consideration.  Part III will 
briefly discuss the work of the four selected Justices while on the Court to consider the 
extent to which empathy can if at all be discerned from their work on the Court as well as 
draw some other summary conclusions from merging the work in Parts I and II.  The 
result is that empathy’s impact in constitutional jurisprudence is hardly predictable or 
reliable, and that though beneficial and meaningful, empathy should probably not be 
relied upon as the primary factor in selecting a Justice but should be considered alongside 
other factors.  
I. The Obama Standard of Empathy 
President Obama’s understanding of empathy as a qualification for members of 
the Supreme Court is clear, reasonable, and workable.  The president’s views, however, 
have not been unanimously embraced by lawmakers and jurists and represent one side of 
a significant legal and jurisprudential rift.  The depth and ideological complexity of this 
two-sided debate makes touting empathy as a primary quality sought in nominees to the 
Court politically difficult and potentially dangerous to the nominee.30   
a. Obama’s Empathy: Reasonable and Workable 
What precisely President Obama means when he has expressed a desire to appoint 
Justices with “empathy” is not exactly certain but can be gleaned from his his 2006 book 
The Audacity of Hope.31  Distinguishing empathy from “sympathy or charity,”32 Obama 
refers to empathy as a “call to stand in somebody else’s shoes, and see through their 
eyes.”  A leading scholar on Obama’s call for empathy on the Court, John Paul Rollert, 
                                                 
30
  See generally Rollert, supra note 7.   
31
  See also , id. at 100 (“Obama’s only sustained discussion of empathy comes not in his speeches or 
in remarks he made during his presidential campaign, but in…The Audacity of Hope.”). 
32
  Barack Obama, The Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream 66 (2006).   
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calls Obama’s distinction between “sympathy and charity” on the one hand and empathy 
on the other “critically important.”33  Despite possibly leading to feelings of sympathy in 
cases where there is serious suffering, the exercise of empathy, Rollert writes, is 
distinguishable from sympathy in that empathy “is characterized not by the pity we feel 
for others but by our attempt to understand their reality.”34  Empathy in the Obama view 
is not feeling sorrow on behalf of a litigant, but seeking to understand the “setbacks and 
triumphs”35 and the “blessings as well as [the] burdens”36 of the litigant.  It is this clear 
distinction between sympathy and empathy that helps make empathy both a virtuous 
aspiration for nominees to the Supreme Court as well as a reasonable and fairly workable 
policy consideration.  This is especially so given the legal ambiguity in those extremely 
unique cases that make it before the Court.     
In speeches on the notion of appointing a Justice with empathy Barack Obama has 
been fairly explicit and illustrative in articulating his understanding of the term and the 
distinct meaning of empathy.  In a 2007 speech at a conference for Planned Parenthood 
then-Senator Obama remarked that “we need somebody who’s got the…empathy, to 
recognize what it’s like to be a young teenage mom…[t]he empathy to understand what 
it’s like to be poor, or African-American, or gay, or disabled, or old.”37  Again these 
remarks show that the Obama concept of empathy is distinct from the notion of pure 
sympathy.  President Obama does not advance empathy as a means for jurists to fall prey 
                                                 
33
  Rollert, supra note 7 at 100.   
34
  Id.    
35
  Id.   
36
  Id.   
37
  Senator Barack Obama, Address Before the Planned Parenthood Action Fund, (July 17, 2007) 
available at http://sites.google.com/site/lauraetch/barackobamabeforeplannedparenthoodaction cited by 
Crowe, supra note 14.   
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to whimsical emotions, but as means for them to understand the broader context and 
experience of each of the litigants before them in an effort to “arriv[e] at just decisions 
and outcomes”38 when “the law strays into uncertainty.”39 
b. Umpire v. Empathizer 
The Obama concept of empathy can be understood in the context of what have 
emerged as the principle divergent views on the role and duty of Supreme Court 
Justices:40 the Justice with “empathy”41 as articulated by President Barack Obama and the 
Justice as “umpire”42 as espoused by Chief Justice John Roberts.  These views are 
characterized by the argument either that a Justice be like an “umpire” in that they do not 
make the rules but simply apply them,43 or instead, have “empathy” in their role on the 
bench when filling the obvious gaps in the law exposed by cases and controversies that 
are “those 5 percent of cases that are truly difficult.”44  A Justice with empathy is not a 
perfect opposite of a Justice merely applying the rules like an “umpire,” but the two 
notions nonetheless represent political and theoretical loggerheads in the current debate 
on the role of empathy as advanced by President Obama.45   
                                                 
38
  President Barack Obama, Remarks on the Retirement of Justice David Souter, supra note 4.   
39
  Rollert, supra note7 at 102.   
40
  See Sparling, supra note 24 at 3-7.   
41
  See Floor Statement, supra note 1.   
42
  Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief Justice of the United 
States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005)(Statement of John G. 
Roberts)[hereinafter Roberts Hearing].   
43
  Id.  See also  Aaron S. J. Zelinsky, Benching the Judge-Umpire Analogy, 119 Yale L.J. Online 113 
(2010) available at http://yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part/supreme-court/the-justice-as-
commissioner:-benching-the-judge%11umpire-analogy/. 
44
  Floor Statement, supra note 1.   
45
  See generally Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, The Constitution as the Playbook for Judicial Selection, 32 
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 1035 (2009).  It is also worth noting that Chief Justice Roberts’ view that “Judges 
and Justices are servants of the law” seems to conflict directly with President Wilson’s view on Supreme 
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The dangers for the nominee of an in-depth public debate over empathy in a 
confirmation hearing—or on virtually any other topic for that matter—are too obvious to 
warrant much extended discussion in this paper.  The leading example of the 
ramifications of a nominee’s willingness to engage in controversial detailed scholarly 
discourse in the public eye during a confirmation hearing is undoubtedly Robert Bork.46  
Since the Bork hearings it has been said that “[t]he incentive in these [senate 
confirmation] hearings is for the senators to say as much, and the nominees to say as 
little, as possible.”47  The negative implications of a nominee discussing empathy in too 
great of detail during a confirmation hearing are too great to warrant such extended 
discussion.  As has been noted, “the real debate underlying the empathy controversy is 
not whether judges can simply make up the rules (or the laws) as they go along…The 
debate is over the relative clarity of the law…and where a judge should look whenever 
the law is unclear.”48  This debate appears to be too risky for nominees to embark upon in 
the confirmation hearing setting.  These implications and the meaning of discussions 
surrounding empathy in select confirmation hearings and nominations is the subject to 
which the next section turns.      
 
II. Empathy and The Confirmation Process 
                                                                                                                                                 
Court Justices and the law.  Compare  Statement of John G. Roberts, supra note 30 with Woodrow Wilson, 
“An After-Dinner Talk,” supra note 14.  It is also worth noting that Chief Justice Roberts’ view has been 
challenged head-on by another leading jurist, Richard Posner, who leveled the claim that no person 
honestly believes the rules in our judicial system are given to judges “…the way the rules of baseball are 
given to umpires.”  Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 78 (2008).   
46
  See Kenji Yoshino, On Empathy in Judgment (Measure for Measure), 57 Clev. St. L. Rev. 683, 
683 (2009). 
47
  Id.  
48
  John Paul Rollert, The Suprising Star at Elena Kagan’s Hearing: Thurgood Marshall, The 
Christian Science Monitor (Jul. 8, 2010).   
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By examining the nomination and confirmation processes of four current Justices 
we can glean both the significance of empathy as a quality for members of the Court as 
well as the political sensitivity of the term given the umpire versus empathizer 
ideological debate just discussed.  This section considers the nomination and 
confirmation of four Justices arguably nominated for what were understood to be the 
unique perspectives they would bring to the Court vis-a-vis their personal backgrounds: 
Clarence Thomas;49 Ruth Bader Ginsburg;50 Sonia Sotomayor;51 and, Elena Kagan.52  
Though empathy is a quality that one can attempt to espouse and exercise regardless of 
background or upbringing, notions of empathy in the current discourse seem indelibly 
tied to the background experiences of nominees.53 
a. Clarence Thomas 
The clear disconnect between what Clarence Thomas was expected to bring to the 
Court once confirmed based on his confirmation testimony and what he seems instead to 
                                                 
49
  See Eric L. Muller, Where, But For the Grace of God Goes He? The Search for Empathy in The 
Criminal Jurisprudence of Clarence Thomas, 15 Const. Commentary 225 (1998)(describing the nomination 
and confirmation of Clarence Thomas as consisting of a “strategy of emphasizing [Thomas’] impoverished, 
racism-tinged upbringing in the tiny town of Pin-Point, Georgia, rather than his professional 
accomplishments and commitments”).   
50
  See Byron York, Advice and Consent? How Clinton Chose Ginsburg, National Review Online 
(Jul. 5, 2005)(quoting Clinton White House senior staffer George Stephanopoulos  from his book All too 
Human as saying Ginsburg “would be the first Jewish Justice since Abe Fortas, and the first woman to be 
appointed by a Democrat.  More important, she was a pioneer in the legal fight for women’s rights–a 
female Thurgood Marshall”) available at  http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/214854/advice-and-
consent-how-clinton-chose-ginsburg/byron-york.   
51
  See, e.g., Remarks on the Retirement of Justice David Souter, supra note 4 (describing the Obama 
administration’s viewpoint on empathy as a criteria for nominees).  As Sotomayor and Kagan were both 
nominated by President Obama it can be inferred that their life experiences and the effect these would have 
on their empathy were considerations of the president.     
52
  Id. 
53
  See  supra notes 48-51.  See also Riddhi Dasgupta, Rising Above Themselves: Why Today’s 
Lawyers of Color Must Look Beyond Color, 16 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 495 (2010);  Gilbert, supra note 18.  
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have brought to the Court has been extensively noted.54  Interestingly, much of the 
discussion in this respect pertains to empathy,55 or as Thomas himself puts it in his 
confirmation hearing the ability to “walk in the shoes”56 of those before the Court.  
Thomas described his ability to level with litigants as “something different”57 he would 
bring to the Court, using empathy to bear in mind “the people who are affected by what 
the Court does.”58  In a manner almost identical to the vision of empathy advanced by 
President Obama, Clarence Thomas said of criminal defendants specifically that as a 
judge “you feel that you have the same fate, or could have, as those individuals.”59  Taken 
at face value then, it seems clear that Clarence Thomas as a nominee at least purported to 
espouse an empathy or empathetic tendencies nearly identical to those advanced by 
President Obama.60 
Despite the similarities between the Thomas and Obama notions of empathy the 
ideological divide that tinges today’s debate over empathy did not seem to exist when 
Thomas was nominated.  In fact, empathy was seen as an admirable quality in Thomas 
and his empathy was praised openly by President George H.W. Bush at the time of his 
                                                 
54
  Muller, ibid. 
55
  See, e.g., id.  at 229 (discussing how a justice supposedly “walk[ing] in the shoes” of criminal 
defendants could possibly rule against them so frequently).    
56
  Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 
260 (1991)(Statement of Clarence Thomas) [hereinafter Thomas Hearing]. 
57
  Id. 
58
  Id.   
59
  Id.  
60
  Id.  Accord. Obama, supra note 31 at 67 (“We wouldn’t tolerate schools that don’t teach, that are 
chronically underfunded and understaffed and underinspired, if we thought the children in them were 
somehow like our children.  It’s hard to imagine a CEO of a company giving himself a multimillion-dollar 
bonus while cutting health-care coverage for his workers if he thought they were in some sense his 
equals.”).   
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nomination.61 What’s more Thomas was purposefully chosen to take the seat of Thurgood 
Marshall,62 a Justice widely and perhaps controversially regarded by many for his views 
on empathy as a jurist.63  Albeit with significant reservations by many in the civil rights 
community64 Thomas was embraced by the right as an acceptable replacement to 
Marshall on the Court.65 When nominating Thomas, President Bush said that Thomas was 
“delightful and warm”66 and stated plainly that Thomas was a “person who had great 
empathy.”67  In the nomination and Senate confirmation of Clarence Thomas any 
empathetic qualities Thomas espoused were laudable and fairly uncontroversial.  To be 
sure his actual use of empathy on the Court is another matter, the implications of which 
are taken up in Part III.    
b. Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
Similarly to the nomination and confirmation of Clarence Thomas, empathy as 
informed by unique background experiences was not a trait to be shied away from in the 
nomination and confirmation of Ruth Bader Ginsburg.68  Indeed, the benefits of empathy 
                                                 
61
  See Brian Beutler, Flashback: George H.W. Bush on Clarence Thomas’ Empathy, Talking Points 
Memo (May 27, 2009) available at http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2009/05/flashback-george-hw-
bush-on-clarence-thomas-great-empathy.php.   
62
  See “Clarence Thomas,” The Oyez Project, available at 
http://www.oyez.org/justices/clarence_thomas.  
63
  See Rollert, supra note 47.   
64
  See Evan Thomas, Where Does He Stand?, Newsweek (Jul. 14, 1991) available at 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/1991/07/14/where-does-he-stand.html.   
65
  See id.   
66
  Beutler, supra note 60.     
67
  Id.   
68
  It is clear from the testimony that Justice Ginsburg’s background is unique and meaningful for a 
host of reasons including her Judaism, her upbringing in a first-generation family, and socio-economic 
difficulties as a child.  See infra note 68 at 186.  However, due to space constraints and the significant work 
of Ginsburg in the area of women’s rights this paper focuses primarily on Justice Ginsburg’s background as 
it pertains to gender and serving as the second woman on the Court.  See also Emily Bazelon, The Place of 
  
16 
 
were explicitly invoked when Ginsburg was asked by Senator Metzenbaum whether she 
could “understand what it is to have your boss threaten your livelihood and your family’s 
economic well-being…[in response to] trying to organize”69 for better working 
conditions.  Ginsburg’s response was unwavering: “I think that if you take a full and fair 
look at the body of decisions I have written…you will be well satisfied that I possess the 
empathy you have just expressed.”70 
It also seems clear that Ginsburg’s experiences as a leading woman in the law and 
what she would bring to the Court as a result of these experiences were seen as net 
positives for the Court by many.  Senator Moynihan upon introducing and recommending 
Ginsburg to the Senate Judiciary Committee highlighted Ginsburg’s role as one of the 
early woman law clerks to the Supreme Court, her experience as “one of the first tenured 
women professors in the country”71 and as a “moving force behind the women’s rights 
project of the American Civil Liberties Union, the prime architect of the fight to 
invalidate discriminatory laws against individuals on the basis of gender.”72  Senator 
D’Amato similarly praised Ginsburg’s enrollment at Harvard Law School “at a time 
when it was not popular for young women to enter law school”73 and cited with apparent 
admiration her “difficult time breaking the ‘old boy’ network that excluded so many 
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other fine law graduates.”74  Eleanor Holmes Norton of the District of Columbia praised 
Ginsburg for spending her life “making things how they ought to be,”75 and for “us[ing] 
the law, always carefully, always defensibly, for all those left at the margins”76 only after 
calling her “the chief navigator in the journey that took women…into the safe harbor of 
the U.S. Constitution.”77   
The Judiciary Committee was made aware at the time of Ginsburg’s confirmation 
hearing of the possible affect Ginsburg’s background experiences could have in her role 
as a Justice on the Court.  “Constitutional interpretation,”78 Senator DeConcini reminded 
the group, “requires an exercise of discretionary judgment[] [t]hus, we must carefully 
choose the Constitution’s most important interpreters.”79  Such remarks show that the 
Judiciary Committee was conscious of the ways in which Ginsburg’s background could 
impact her work on the Court, especially where the law is uncertain.  Interestingly 
however it does not seem as though empathy specifically arose as a proxy for judicial 
activism or for biased decision-making as it would in later nominations and 
confirmations, beginning with that of Justice Sonia Sotomayor.   
c. Sonia Sotomayor 
The nomination and confirmation of Sonia Sotomayor appears to be the beginning 
of real controversy in the debate over empathy in the nomination and confirmation 
process.  Republicans were quick to call President Obama’s empathy standard “a code 
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word for an activist judge.”80  Moreover, it became clear in the Sotomayor hearings that 
the empathy debate was more accurately “over the relative clarity of the law…and where 
a judge should look whenever the law is unclear.”81  Senator Orrin Hatch’s remarks to the 
Federalist Society in 2009 are an apt summary of the opposition to President Obama’s 
empathy standard in the context of the Sotomayor nomination:  “In [the] activist view of 
judicial power, the desired ends defined by a judge’s empathy justify whatever means he 
uses to decide cases…[t]his activist view of judicial power is at odds with our written 
constitution….”82  While President Obama explicitly advanced his version of empathy as 
a key trait in nominees to the Court with the nomination of Sonia Sotomayor,83 detractors 
were quick to reveal their underlying fears of the empathy standard as a broad license for 
judges in decision-making and discretion.   
Given the strong reaction to empathy84 as a quality sought in Supreme Court 
nominees and the political implications of an extended debate over empathy85 it was 
unsurprisingly a subject that then-nominee Sotomayor attempted to skirt and deny during 
her confirmation hearings.86 This is so despite the widespread discussion of empathy in 
the opening statements of both Republican and Democratic senators at the hearings.87  
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Speaking second at the outset of the hearing Senator Jeff Sessions set the tone for the 
opposition to the empathy standard saying “this ‘empathy standard’ is another step down 
the road to a liberal activist, results-oriented, and relativistic world where…unelected 
judges set policy, [and] Americans are seen as members of separate groups….”88  He 
continued on to imply that through an empathy standard fairness and impartiality were 
suspect, saying curtly “I will not vote for…an individual…who is not fully committed to 
fairness and impartiality toward every person who appears before them.”89 This was a 
subject area that clearly posed a philosophical, and in turn political, bramble patch for 
Sotomayor.90  When given the opportunity to address the Judiciary Committee Sotomayor 
stated that her judicial philosophy was simply “fidelity to the law”91 and that in each case 
she has heard she has simply “applied the law to the facts at hand.”92  The task of the 
judge, Sotomayor repeated with conviction, “is not to make the law, it is to apply the 
law.”93 
Much of the remaining discussions of empathy in the Sotomayor hearings 
revolved around Sotomayor’s Latina background and alleged bias in favor of Latinos 
given her infamous remarks on “wise Latina”94 women.  Responding to various charges 
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that her comments that “a wise Latina woman…would…reach a better conclusion”95 in 
certain decisions show bias on her part and thus the potential dangers of empathy as a 
consideration Sotomayor stated that “I do not believe that any ethnic, racial, or gender 
group has an advantage in sound judging…I do believe that every person has an equal 
opportunity to be a good and wise judge regardless of their background….”96  Despite 
successful attempts by many to—in the words of one eminent senator—make a 
“mountain out of a molehill”97 of Sotomayor’s remarks and her empathy, Sotomayor 
managed to successfully evade in-depth engagement in a Bork-like debate on empathy 
and her background.  As a result she was successfully confirmed.98   
d. Elena Kagan 
In 2010 Elena Kagan was nominated by President Obama to the United States 
Supreme Court and was confirmed by the United States Senate in a 63-37 vote.99  No 
mention of empathy was made by the Obama administration when appointing Kagan or 
upon the retirement of Justice John Paul Stevens.100 Kagan’s controversy over remarks on 
the role of confirmation hearings are perhaps most instructive for purposes of 
understanding empathy and its elusive role in the Supreme Court confirmation process 
and on the Court.   
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Having served as both Dean of Harvard Law School and Solicitor General of the 
United States Kagan’s professional qualifications were hardly a serious point of 
contention.101  Instead the Senate Judiciary Committee, as with nearly all recent 
nominees, focused begrudgingly on seeking to uncover just what kind of Justice Kagan 
might be if confirmed and with reconciling apparent inconsistencies.102  In written 
responses Kagan answered questions from Senator Orrin Hatch regarding her 1995 
Chicago Law Review article “Confirmation Messes, Old and New.”103  In the article 
Kagan argued that when Senators fail to delve deep into legal issues with Court nominees 
the Senate and public lose their ability to meaningfully evaluate the nominee.104  
Responding to Senator Hatch’s request for her to reconcile her 1995 position with her 
pending nomination Kagan responded with an about face on her prior position:  “I 
am…less convinced than I was in 1995 that public discussions of substantive legal issues 
and views, in the context of nomination hearings, provide the great public benefits I 
suggested….”105  Kagan subsequently confessed that her “views on this question have 
evolved in some ways, but [she] continue[s] to think the question well worth 
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exploring.”106  Given Justice Kagan’s scholarship on the confirmation process and her 
subsequent reversal in confirmation testimony, her remarks perhaps most significantly 
leave open serious questions as to the proper role of Senate confirmation hearings.  But 
her responses to these inquires are also revealing when one considers the way in which 
considerations of empathy were disowned by nominee-Kagan at the time of her 
confirmation.   
At Kagan’s hearing Senator John Kyl noted the arguable point that Justice 
Sotomayor, in her confirmation hearings, “explicitly rejected the empathy standard”107 
that had been advanced by President Obama.  Kyl further claimed that in nominating 
Kagan the president “repackaged”108 empathy.  Kagan however, like Sotomayor, proved 
adept at avoiding significant discussions of empathy and rather unarguably rejected 
President Obama’s view explicitly.  When asked by Senator Kyl whether she agreed that 
the law “only takes you the first 25 miles of the marathon and that the last mile has to be 
decided by what is in the judge’s heart”109 Kagan stated: “Senator Kyl, I think it’s the law 
all the way down…the question is what the law requires.”110  When probed further on the 
president’s empathy standard Kagan simply remarked “I don’t know what the President 
was speaking about specifically.”111  Kagan’s remarks on the confirmation process and 
empathy in her testimony are revealing of the ways in which old ideas can be disowned 
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and the fabric of history and intellectual thought re-spun.  Obviously opinions, attitudes, 
and viewpoints shift and can change over time.     
 
 
III. Rethinking Empathy 
A good argument exists that despite the seemingly obvious benefits that seem to 
result from empathy its impact in specific decisions of the Court is hard to predict, 
decipher, or even distinguish.  Whether or not a particular Justice will employ empathy in 
a particular case—like adherence to any principle promised or conveyed in a 
confirmation hearing—is highly uncertain.  As such, the strength of empathy as the sole 
criterion in appointing Justices to the Supreme Court remains elusive and reasonably 
open to question.  This is so for a number of reasons but chiefly because of the utter 
unpredictability of the decisions of Justices once confirmed to the Court.112  
Justice Clarence Thomas serves as an apt example. For all of President Bush’s 
talk of his jovial comportment and resounding “empathy,”113 and Thomas’ own talk of his 
ability to “walk in the shoes”114 of litigants, Thomas is now uncontroversially viewed as 
one of the Court’s most un-empathetic Justices.115  This has notably been seen in his 
dissent in Hudson v. McMillian, in which Thomas took the unpopular position that the 
abuse of a prisoner by prison guards in that particular case did not rise to the level of 
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being cruel and unusual punishment.116  Despite a 7-2 decision by the Court in favor of 
the brutally abused prisoner117 Thomas’ apparent view that the Eighth Amendment 
“should not be turned into…a National Code of Prison Regulation”118 seemed to trump 
any considerations of empathy for the prisoner.   
Justice Ginsburg on the other hand has been said to actively employ her 
experiences as a pioneering woman in the law to empathize with litigants,119 and this is 
arguably seen in her dissent in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.120  Justice 
Sotomayor, despite being touted as President Obama’s model of empathy, has had her 
empathy described by at least one Democratic senator as “not all that it was cracked up to 
be.”121  In-depth academic work focusing on Justice Sotomayor and her decisions on 
immigration and criminal convictions show that “far from allowing empathy to color her 
decision-making, she has tended to decide these cases based on neutral principles”122 and 
often with “harsh consequences.”123  Justice Kagan, who has spent little time on the 
Supreme Court or any bench for that matter has managed to evade much formal 
evaluation of her use of empathy, though we do know from her confirmation hearing that 
she is, at least publicly, somewhat perplexed as to empathy’s “specific[]”124 application. 
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How can we tell with any certainty whether a Justice is employing empathy in a 
particular case, regardless of whether or not they rule for or against the litigant with 
whom one might reasonably expect them to empathize or be empathetic?  The short 
answer, revealed in the confirmation testimonies and subsequent tenures of the four 
Justices discussed herein is that it is hardly at all possible to tell.  Like stare decisis,125 
principles of comity, abstention doctrines, or myriad cannons of statutory interpretation, 
empathy on the bench appears not only necessary and purposeful on its face, but also 
clouded in its actual application by a mystery akin only to doctrines of judicial discretion.  
Elena Kagan’s reversals and denials in her confirmation hearing show how opinions and 
ideas change over time.  Perhaps Justice Kagan will evolve as a champion of empathy 
while Justice Sotomayor will prove the opposite.  The only real certainty is that 
predictions with purporting any degree of certainty on this matter seem difficult to make.              
It comes as no surprise then that in recent nominations and confirmations empathy 
as a code word for activist judges has really become a “strawman.”126  The more accurate 
debate at its heart pertains to what judges should do in the face of a dearth of legal 
clarity127 in “the last mile”128 of a constitutional decision where the law provides no 
concrete answers.  One side says that decisions at this point are only made “on the basis 
of one’s deepest values, one’s core concerns, one’s broader perspectives on how the 
world works, and the depth and breadth of one’s empathy.”129  The other side of this 
debate seems to settle for calling such a position activist.  Interestingly, in offering no 
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solution this same side also fails to acknowledge that ambiguity in certain constitutional 
decisions exists at all, preferring to think that every constitutional pitch is either clearly 
the proverbial ball or strike.  Either way, the proper place of empathy in judicial decision-
making—that is, to contribute where the law fails to serve-up concrete answers—again 
portends the potential for uncertainty in its actual application.   
 
 
Conclusion 
It has been said that the debate over judicial empathy is one that is not recent but 
has really been going on for centuries.130  The revelation that the debate over empathy is 
really a debate over what a Justice should do where the law is silent indeed supports this 
point131 and indicates that the debate over empathy, at least beyond its being a political 
buzzword, will not cease in the near future though it may shift in form. The Obama 
administration’s conception of empathy appears to be clear, reasonable, and workable but 
obvious political considerations in the confirmation process seem to have stymied overtly 
embracing empathy as a consideration or publicly debating its merits.  Despite this 
phenomenon it also seems clear from Court opinions, the scholarly literature, and the way 
in which the minds of Justices change once on the Court that the role empathy plays for a 
particular Justice on the Court is really quite unpredictable in any given case.   
All of this suggests that perhaps empathy should not be the leading consideration 
advanced by the president in choosing a nominee but rather should play more of a 
supporting role along with other considerations.  Despite the convincing and I believe 
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correct arguments—shown in the testimonies of various nominees nominated by various 
presidents over two decades—for why empathy is a meaningful and admirable quality 
this remains the case.  However, that empathy should be considered alongside other 
qualities does not mean that these other qualities that should be considered are any less 
nebulous and complicated than the empathy standard itself.  This paper will leave 
exploration of these qualities for further academic work in this area.  It will leave to the 
president and senate the unenviable task of attempting to find out exactly “what is in 
the…heart”132 of a given nominee on any given day.        
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